Category Archives: ideas

Does This Concern You?

(1) Common Sense

Sitting across from a friend at dinner, I mind my manners. I’m careful not to be late, to make sure I don’t insult him, to make sure his experience with me is pleasant and fulfilling. I do this because I can’t stand the thought that I would be the cause of someone else’s discomfort. If I do feel as though I have created some discomfort, I’m quick to try to repair it with an apology–either written or spoken or in the form of a gift. This also holds for the people sitting at the tables around us. I’m careful not cause them discomfort either.

In general, I try to make sure that I don’t cause others discomfort. To do this I have to be aware of how my actions or words might cause discomfort, amending what I do and say accordingly. I don’t say or do hurtful things on purpose, and I try to reduce the chances that I will do them unconsciously. Obviously the are times when I fail at this, and when I do, as I said above, I try to repair it.

(2) A Suicide

Earlier this year, a chinese factory worker that produces iPhones committed suicide at work. I have no idea why he killed himself. It could have been because of work, his personal life, or some mixture of the two. Let’s assume that his job–the nature of his work–played a role in his despair.

Everyone trusts statistics. Let’s assume that his work played a 40% role in his despair. Not all of it, but a good chunk of it. In other words, his despair was forty percent composed by his feelings about his work.

(3) How This Concerns Me

In September I purchased an iPhone. I went to the Apple store and gave the attendant money in exchange for it. I’d saved this money from my own salary to make the purchase. I wanted the phone for various reasons, which I rehearsed to myself and others to justify the purchase:

I’d like to know where I’m going with GPS;
I can check email, which is good for work;
it’s cool;
there’s a sale going on;
I can have my music, movies, and reading all in one place;
my friends all have iPhones;
I just want it;
etc.

To what extent am I thinking about people like the man who killed himself? When I want the iPhone I don’t consider the lives of the people who produce it, despite the fact that my purchasing the iPhone actively participates in a production cycle that, among other things, caused forty percent of a man’s suicidal despair.

This concerns me because my desire for the iPhone helps create the conditions that caused 40% of someone’s suicide. This concerns me further when I think about the great care I take not to cause discomfort in others.

(4) Theoretical Interpretation: Butler and Grieveability

I take great care to not cause strangers in a restaurant any discomfort, but yet I helped create the conditions that caused a man to kill himself. Why?

Judith Butler, in an interview at Guernica, writes that

All I really have to say about life is that for it to be regarded valuable, it has to be regarded as grieveable. And I think we can see that entire populations are considered negligible by warring powers, so when they’re destroyed there is no sense that an egregious act has been committed…

She said this in response to a question about war, not economics, but there is a disturbing similarity in its principle that applies to my concern here. When participating as a consumer in a market like the market for iPhones, to what extent do I regard the lives of other participants in that market grieveable? In the example of the iPhone factory worker, a life was destroyed. Forty percent of the force that caused the destruction of that life directly resulted from my purchasing an iPhone. To me, this man’s life–and the lives of his colleagues–are negligible. They’re not grieveable. According to Butler (and I agree) their lives aren’t valuable. When I participate in the market, I don’t value the lives of others in that market. I only value what I can get and how much I can get for it.

(5) How This Concerns You

If this is true for me, then it’s true for you to the extent that you participate in markets as a consumer:

Specifically: if you bought an iPhone and didn’t think about this man and his colleagues, then you don’t value their lives.

Generally: if you buy anything and don’t think about the people (and ecologies) that produce them, then you don’t value their lives.

(6) Half-earnest, Half-rhetorical Question To The Reader

Does this concern you?

 

A Theory of Fiction

(1)

I’m sitting on the subway. I’m looking at my reflection in the window. It’s hazy and dirty and scarred by graffiti, but the window still presents a likeness–my image, sitting on the subway.

I see myself sitting there with others. A woman wears leopard-patterned leggings. A child plays a video game. A teenager reads a magazine. An old man reads a newspaper in a language I don’t recognize. I’m wearing whatever it is I’m wearing. I stare at all of us in the window to see us all there, together.

The train stops. A beautiful woman boards wearing a beret and a dark peacoat. She listens to headphones. Her skin is freckled and her hair curly. Her eyes are green. She grabs a metal pole and looks around the car, situating herself. She sees me seeing her. I look away. I find her reflection in the window.

Just as the doors close a man enters. He’s tall, wearing black pants and a black winter coat. He wears a knit cap. His eyes are low. He exhales heavily, looking around at us. He sees me seeing him. I look away. I find his reflection in the window.

The train screams through its tunnels beneath the city. I continue surveying the world in the mirror: the child looks up from his video game to kiss his mother, the old man falls asleep, the beautiful woman closes her eyes and nods her to the beat of a song playing on her headphones. The man-in-black’s coat is open. His eyes saccade back and forth. He’s readying himself for something. He keeps his hand in the breast pocket of his coat. Removing his hand for a fraction of a second, I see a gun’s black and silver handle.

The man in black reaches for the gun, stepping toward the child, the old man, and the beautiful woman. His hand goes towards the gun. But before he can grasp it, before anyone knows what’s about to happen, I stick my foot out and trip him. He falls, yelling. Everyone looks up. The gun slides out and arrives at the old man, who puts down his newspaper and takes the gun and points it at the man in black. “Don’t move,” he says. We call the police. The woman in leopard-print pants holds the man down. The police come and take the man in black away.

(2)

Fiction makes worlds in windows, reflections of events. Some writers write to gaze in wonder at themselves in the world. Some writers write to gaze in wonder at the world itself. Some writers write to gaze in wonder at what needs changing, either in themselves or in the world or both. The first is a narcissist. The second is a thalist. The third is a pragmatist.

The gods made Narcissus the most beautiful creature. Few resisted his looks. So when he saw himself in the reflection of a small pond’s surface he fell in love with himself. He couldn’t look away. He changed into a flower, the kind that grows at the edges of small reflective pools. Flowers are pretty, perennial, and have a valuable place in their ecologies. They die and grow again, serving their various purposes. Writers that gaze at themselves in their writing are similar, except they choose their fate. They have the option to look away but, for whatever reason, continue looking at themselves. The narcissist gazes in wonder at himself in the subway’s window, outlining his own face and outfit, thinking about his relation to the subway, to the others sitting around him, telling himself his own story. He’s so occupied with himself that doesn’t see the gun in the man-in-black’s jacket. He’s in danger, like the rest of the subway riders, except that he has the opportunity to manage that danger–to see the gun. Overwhelmed by his own beauty, the narcissist chooses not to put himself in the position to see the gun, or anything other than himself. He therefore cannot help himself or his fellow riders, though danger is imminent.

Thales was the first Greek philosopher. He was able to predict crop growths and solar eclipses; was an advisor to governments; was known widely for his intelligence. Plato tells the following story about him:

…one night Thales was gazing at the sky as he walked and fell into a ditch. A pretty servant girl lifted him out and said to him “How do you expect to understand what is going on up in the sky if you do not even see what is at your feet?”

The thalist writer gazes in wonder and falls into a ditch. She’s not lost in the beauty of her own image, but rather the beauty of the world around her. She’s so concerned with its truth, its extent, that she makes herself vulnerable to concrete disaster.  She produces great truths, but focuses on their form to such a degree that she loses the immediacy of its content. Having fallen in her ditch she is slow to react. On the subway she’s busy sketching the child’s form, his face buried in the screen of his video game; the leopard-pattern of the woman’s pants, its oranges and whites and browns and yellows; the wrinkles of the old man’s face, the sound his newspaper makes when it rustles; the beautiful woman’s green eyes, her peacoat, the rhythm of her music in sync with the tracks of the train. The thalist might not even see the man-in-black’s gun–she’s not looking for it. At some point she might get around to sketching his facial features and clothing and then see the gun’s handle, but time is a relevant factor. There’s a likelihood that she’ll see the gun, but given her attention to detail the chances aren’t high. Most likely, the thalist is too late. She fails to help herself and her fellow riders not because she wasn’t looking, but she wasn’t looking for a gun.

Pragmatism is an American philosophy. It assigns values to texts based on their “usefulness.” Peirce used usefulness to assign truth-values to scientific theories, claiming that theories are true if they’re useful to the scientific community; that is, if they “successfully lead” to other scientific ideas.  James used usefulness to assign truth-values to religious belief, claiming that beliefs are true if they’re useful to the believer; that is, if they “work” to help the believer live peacefully and with certainty in the world. Both these uses of usefulness de-emphasize an objective reality that exists “out there” and focus rather on what is here and now, the experiences of individuals and the concrete results of text in the world. The pragmatist writer isn’t self-obsessed, nor is she obsessed with the truth of the world in which she finds herself. She is concerned with what will be useful to her readers, what will “work” for them, what will “successfully lead” them to more meaningful and flourishing lives.  She is didactic in that she has ideas about what counts as a more flourishing life and is interested in telling others about these ideas. This may seem like hubris. However, her craft is modest: she presents an image, a story, ultimately an object of interpretation, a world-reflection within which readers are free to find their own meanings–not necessarily hers. But her goal is to help, and so her world is crafted with a vision of betterness, with the hope that the world can be a safer place for the humans living within it. She’s in a position to see the man-in-black’s gun and stick her foot out to trip him.

Each of these writers has virtues and vices. What looks like a gun might be an iPod, and the pragmatist may find herself tripping innocents. The narcissist may in fact be a superior beauty, whose looks deserve analysis. The thalist produces valuable truths, never committed to a moral side, and is safe from the volatile, even vain, question of what is right and wrong. Each of them are committed to reflection rather than blind following. They each choose to look into the window, think about what they see, and represent it to others. They aren’t committed to taking advantage of others for financial or emotional reasons. They aren’t tyrants. They should be praised for this.

Despite these common virtues, I value the pragmatist best among the writers. She is the modest artist looking for men-in-black, the guns in their jackets, and knows that tripping them up is the right thing to do.  We all want the best for the world in some way–if we didn’t it would be difficult to brush our teeth in good faith–and the pragmatist writer is most authentically committed to this desire.

This is my nascent opinion. I haven’t found perfect exemplars of each of these kinds of fiction. I’m open to suggestions. Though I do know that John Steinbeck’s The Moon is Down and Dave Eggers’s What is the What qualify as pragmatist fiction. The former is the one I think of first: It’s the story of a nameless town in northern Europe that successfully resists a foreign army’s attempt to occupy it. The book was written on commission from the CIA during World War II, translated into several European languages, and distributed covertly in small towns occupied by Nazi forces. The idea was this: if citizens read a story where people like them overcome occupiers, then they themselves would have greater confidence to do so.  This, to me, is the best kind of fiction.

Yes.

That insistence on ‘productivity’, ‘efficiency’, ‘use’, and ‘care for form and function’ is exactly the kind of capitalistic/industrialist language which erects a mask of ‘positive’ ‘values’ around a rapacious system and against which the so called indolence and narcisism of the Artist—as emblematized/scapegoated by the MFA student—revolts against. In which case I say, let’s not let these assholes set us against each other and shift the attention off their own always justifiable ‘values’. All writers, all Artists, those in academia and those outside, should all stand shoulder to shoulder in pursuing the useless expenditure of Art, whether that uselessness takes the form of MFA studies, or community workshops, or slams, or presses, or Youtube reading tours, or anarchic in-house performances, or library reading series, or self-published blogs,or just writing a poem in your notebook, crumpling it up and trashing it, if $65million dollar jets is what ‘productivity’ and ‘efficiency’ and ‘usefulness’ and ‘care for form and function’ look like.

Letter to Veteran’s Association at Columbia University

To Whom It May Concern,

My name is David Backer and I work with the Philosophy Outreach Center
at Teacher’s College. The Outreach seeks to create and maintain philosophical activities in educational and cultural contexts. I write to ask your opinion and
advice about one such program I’ve been thinking about recently.

There has been a clear increase in the prevalence and severity of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in recent veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. The demand for programs and services to help our veterans cope with PTSD has never been higher, but many veterans lack reliable access to counseling and resources for mental and psychological well-being. This can have awful consequences for their re-integration into the society they fought so bravely to protect.

I think philosophical discussion can serve as a kind of palliative for
psychological distress, a way of dealing with traumatic experiences in a rational
and communal way. Philosophy struggles with life’s deepest questions: the meaning of life, the inevitability of death, the existence of God, the nature of justice and morality. The rigor, respect, and community that a philosophical dialogue provides has helped me gain perspective on the greatest difficulties and has helped me find a way of living with painful realities in a productive and meaningful way.

I wonder if veterans would find any solace in philosophical discussion
of topics relevant to their experiences. Would sitting down and discussing the
philosophical questions inherent in war, violence, justice, and combat help to alleviate the psychological pressure they create in the mind of a soldier recently returned from battle?

Do you think such a program, called Philosophy for Veterans or
something similar, could be helpful? If so, would it be feasible to organize? Any feedback, guidance, or thoughts would be greatly appreciated. Having never fought in a war but having great respect for my country and the opportunities it affords me, I’d like to try and help those that have fought in the name of those opportunities.

Sincerely,
David Backer

The Beauty of Hipster Porn

Dear —-,

One sleepless night two months ago I googled “hipster porn” to see what would happen. I sifted through a few sites with no reaction. Then I found thathipsterporn.org and it I gave me a feeling of lightness. Something in my chest felt like it melted, like a fist released it’s fingers. I fell asleep quickly.

A frequent insomniac, I looked at the site a few times after this experience to see if the feeling was just an isolated incident. But it wasn’t: it kept happening. The same lightness. I wondered why. The best explanation I can think of applies Lacan’s master’s discourse to hipsters in the following way.

This is Lacan’s matheme for the master’s discourse. If we define a hipster as an individual belonging to the group of individuals who believe they don’t belong to any group, then this absurd (non)belonging is the hipster’s master signifier (S1). The barred subject, what hipsters don’t want to talk about (barred S, beneath S1) is that we are actually a group, a set of people conforming to one another in a particular set of ways. The knowledge required to conform is the hipster’s slave knowledge (S2): the ironic, apathetic cannon of fashions and behaviors you catalog so well in your work. The objet a (below S2) is whatever visceral unconscious material our slave knowledge forces into repression. This is the Hipster’s master discourse.

The nut of my idea is that hipster porn achieves/expresses/embodies Lacan’s discourse of the analyst, which is the master discourse turned on its head (I can’t find a picture of it anywhere). When the hipster’s barred subject–that we belong to a group–flips and takes precedence over the hipster’s master signifier, and the hipster’s objet a–repressed unconscious material–takes it’s place over the hipster’s slave knowledge, all the things hipsters don’t want to admit or talk about are made explicit. These things, the content of hipster porn, are brought forward and presented to us directly. This is hipster psychoanalysis.

It’s an exciting prospect. What the hipster feels in the analyst’s discourse is pure belonging, the opposite of ironic apathy. This belonging is integrated wholeness, a co-incidence of public and private selves. Hipster pornography is therefore a discourse of authenticity.

Zizek wrote that beauty and shame are similar for Lacan because they both mark a limit. This is especially true for hipsters. Our pornography, the presentation of that which is shameful for us, inspires that which is most beautiful about humanity in general: a realization of self with others in honesty.

What do you think?

Sincerely,
David

P.S. The following image is an interesting example: note the woman’s dream-catcher tattoo, posture, and facial expression; also the decor of the room, particularly the pillow in contrast with the blanket, pillows, and wall.

If You’re A Hipster And You Know It, Clap Your Hands!

N+1 held launched Mark Greif et al’s “What Was the Hipster? A Sociological Study” this past Friday. Greif, a professor at the New School and N+1 editor, brings the philosophical discourse on hipsters to an academic level in this series of essays and commentaries.

It’s important work. Hipsters, though the butt of many jokes, are the occasion for engagement with our time in history. Though not everyone may have been a hippie, for example, that group is still a locus for important questions that define a historical period. By identifying or not identifying with the group– analyzing the literary, musical, fashion, philosophical, and psychoanalytical  streams present in it–we explore what we are and aren’t members of. It’s a locus, an opportunity, an occasion to explore how we’re participating in history.

Hipsters, for better or worse, are a window to our own moment. Getting clear about what they are will help us get clear about what we are. Greif’s project helps us do this. It covers important ground. But we should go further.

A few weeks ago I wrote my most-read blog post ever, a short essay called “Hipster Defined” where I define hipsters set-theoretically as the group whose members believe they’re not members of any group. This definition entails a formal set-theoretic paradox (what I call the Hipster’s Paradox) since hipsters compose a group, but to be a member of this group one must believe one is not a member of any group whatsoever.

This definition also entails an existential explanation for the term’s pejorative use. Here we are, a group of people trying not to conform but doing so together according to rules we must follow. We’re non-conformists conforming. In that sense the hipster is absurd: there’s a clear reality–that we’re part of a group–but we behave and speak as though we’re not members of any group.

In this way I found Greif’s account histiographically rich but definitionally clunky. His approach doesn’t offer a clear definition. Rather, in line with most of the critical hipster cannon, he provides lists of colorful exemplars alongside a variety of relevant social theories.

In addition to being complex (and possibly ironically self-reflexive) I find this approach politically deflating. It doesn’t offer anything for the future. It doesn’t tell us what to do next, what to make of this hipsterism, how to evolve into something new.

But there is a way to do this. Let’s say we are, in fact, members of a group whose members don’t believe they’re members of any group. If we identify as hipsters, if each of us says “Yes. I am a hipster” then we’ll no longer be absurd. We’d recognize ourselves as being members of a groWe’ll recognize our place in history and achieve a radical authenticity. Our public selves will merge with our private selves and we can just be. We can live in the world, be in it without lies or apathy or disappointment. This would be a psychoanalytic revolution. We’d feel a release. A relief. The heaviness of the hipster would dissolve into self co-incidence and self-centricity.

It doesn’t end there. When I admit I’m the member of a group whose members don’t believe they’re in any group, I’m not part of the group anymore.  I believe I’m the member of a group. The hipster definition is violated. I no longer fit it. I can move on. Once I admit I’m a hipster I’m no longer a hipster. I’m just myself.  And this is a radically human conclusion: I’m a contradiction. I’m part of a group and not part of it. I’m free of society but still bound by it.

At the book release I told Greif about my argument. An extremely warm individual, he laughed and nodded and took it seriously. He said my idea begins where his book ends, that he can’t admit he’s a hipster because he just can’t identify with the group. He said this was a function of his age. He told me that he gave a lecture on hipsters at a university recently and during the question/answer period a young student, obviously a hipster, asked him: “I’m a hipster, what should I do?” Greif said he couldn’t sympathize with her. He told her, “I’m not sure.”

That student had the answer. She admitted she’s a hipster. In that moment of self-awareness she produced the possibility for an answer to her own question. When you admit you’re a hipster you’ll no longer be one and the time for a new moment of authenticity arrives. You’re yourself. You’re free. Celebrate this! If you’re a hipster and you know it, clap your hands!

 

Childhood is a window into non-alienated knowledge.

From the point of view of the Romantic protest against the rationalized epistemic universe of the enlightenment, [the child] is a window into another form of knowledge, which is capable, like the forms of knowing of mystics, shamans, women, the mad, etc, of yielding significant information abut the world. For the epistemological counterculture, Piaget’s notion of the adult “decentered” epistemic subject, which has “found in logicomathematical structures an instrument of integration increasingly independent of experience ” by which it “conquers the experienced environment” represents a form of Western bias, a hypertrophy of the Cartesian subject-object split, emblematic of the alienated subjectivity of modernism.”

–David Kennedy, from “Reconstructing Childhood”

I’m interviewed @ Sonora Review.

Thanks Natasha and SR.

New essay at Luna Park.

Luna Park put up my essay “A Manual for Readers,” a spin-off of Donald Barthelme’s “Manual for Sons.” This one is about stories instead of fathers.

Profile of Metazen published @ Zine-Scene.

The new magazine about magazines Zine-Scene published my review of Metazen this morning. My thesis is that the digital realm has reached puberty.