Tag Archives: fiction

Tao Lin’s ‘Richard Yates’ and the Alcibiades

The Socratic dialogue Alcibiades ends with the following lines:

Alcibiades: Yes, that’s right. I’ll start to cultivate justice in myself right now.

Socrates: I should like to believe that you will persevere, but I’m afraid–not because I distrust your nature, but because I know how powerful the city is–I’m afraid it might get the better of both me and you.

At this moment in the dialogue Socrates has convinced the precocious politician Alcibiades that he doesn’t know anything about justice or leadership. Socrates tells him that the only way out of this ignorance is to cultivate himself by getting to know his own soul. But then at the end, just when Alcibiades–also Socrates’s boy beloved–commits himself to this project, Socrates says “Well, go ahead and try, but you’ll probably fail–and so will I.”

Tao Lin’s new novel “Richard Yates” (Melville House) is a similar kind of conversation. It occurs between two lovers, one  older than the other. After hours of conversation the older lover convinces the younger lover that she can’t live without his advice. Then the older lover, pushy and dominating but meaning well, imparts that advice. The younger lover attempts to put it into practice. The older lover constantly doubts that the younger lover will be able to do this.

Obviously RY is a different scene: the conversations take place over email, cell phone, and Gmail chat as well as in the analog. The characters eat vegan food and fly planes and drive cars and go to Georgia and Texas and New York and New Jersey.

But what happens in both texts, Greek and contemporary, is eerily similar. There’s a slow unfolding of personalities through dialogue that exposes us to the strengths and weaknesses of two people. After seeing this interaction the audience is left with a question: How do we get to know–and then be–ourselves?

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Towards the end of the middle of the dialogue Alcibiades gets uncomfortable with Socrates’s tone and method and says “Stop pushing me around!” Alcibiades feels this discomfort because Socrates has shown (told, convinced) him that he’s doing everything wrong and that if he wants to achieve anything he needs to follow Socrates’s guidance and change his entire life. Socrates replies, “No, in fact I’m going to push you around…”

This is Haley Joel Osment’s attitude toward Dakota Fanning, Tao Lin’s two main characters. It’s Haley’s project to change Dakota, though Dakota rarely–if ever–complains as forthrightly as Alcibiades. (She protests in her own furtive way.) Haley tells Dakota what to do and how to do it. His general plea is that she do what she wants without considering his opinion. He wants her to be herself, demands it. This constantly frustrates him. In one such moment of frustration Haley gives Dakota this example:

“It’s like there is a blue pen, a blue and red pen, and a red pen in front of a person and they say they like the blue pen most. But they always use the red pen and then say ‘sorry, next time I will choose the blue and red pen.’ “

Dakota says she wants to work harder, to be better, to choose her favorite color and be herself, but somehow she always falls short of Haley’s expectations. Just after he gives her this pen analogy Haley says “I know it’s hard for you to change.” He continues demanding and she continues failing.

The problem here is a riff on stock romantic tension: X tries to change Y but X finds out that people don’t/can’t change. Lin’s version of this is much more elegant and complex. In the novel X tries to change Y by forcing Y to be whatever Y wants to be. But the force and the freedom cancel each other out here. There’s no way for X to force Y to be free. Freedom is a quality of our purely individual will, untainted by the wills of others. If Y follows X’s order then she’s not free by definition. But if Y doesn’t follow the order, she can’t behave as X demands. It’s Lin’s Paradox.

Haley wonders to himself why he gets so upset when Dakota doesn’t follow his orders, why he orders her around at all. He eventually finds a certain peace with this and helps Dakota improve–cultivate–her life. But the novel ends in confusion, just like the Socratic dialogue. Haley seems to wonder whether or not he’s been doing the right thing by demanding this of Dakota, whether it will work, whether it can work. The answer is (impeccably, tragically) no.

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Late in the dialogue Socrates tells Alcibiades: “If the soul is to know itself it must look at a soul, and especially at that region that makes a soul good…” We see this happening in both the ancient dialogue and Lin’s novel. We see the effect two souls can have on one another when one soul wants the other to be something other than it is; to wit, itself.

We learn that this is impossible. A soul can only ever be itself. And if we force it into other clothes, if we define ourselves by the extent to which we can “change the world” into something it’s not, we’re tragic.

At the end of our conquest we’ll find we’ve been monstrous, or that we’ve exposed our loved ones to monsters from which we can’t protect them. We’ll find ourselves vulnerable and confused like Camus’s conqueror, like Haley or Socrates, confronted with the fact that despite our best efforts we’re just weak human beings among other weak human beings, all of us terribly free and forever unsure what’s to come.

Regarding Joshua Cohen’s Novel ‘Witz’

Dear Mr. Cohen,

I’m sorry. I’m letting go. I got through 200 pages and I can’t do it. I don’t look forward to reading Witz anymore. I don’t look forward to bringing it with me to places. I’m no longer proud to be reading it. I have to put it down.

It’s the style of the thing. The way the sentences are put together. The grammar is yiddishized, which I appreciate, but the predicate and subjects, backwards they are. Which would be fine if the bodies of the segmented worm-like sentences didn’t go on in impassioned lists of unengaging noun-phrases, choking on themselves, on their mundane details, which seem important but aren’t. They take up pages and pages. So when a verb happens, when action occurs, I’m either lost in the list or I’ve lost interest.

When I do understand what’s happening I find myself asking you thematic questions that start with “why,” like: Why kill the Jews? Or more superficial questions, like: Why kill them on such a cliche night as the turn of the millennium? And even logistical questions, like: Why is the subtitle “The Last Jew in the World” present in your Library of Congress title, but nowhere else on the novel itself?

Though the accusation that this book is a Jewish Gravity’s Rainbow has been rejected, it feels to me like that’s what’s happening. I like that idea. I like these kinds of books. I read V. and Gravity’s Rainbow. I read Infinite Jest. I read Gass’s The Tunnel. I like this kind of thing. Plus I’m young and Jewish. And you’re young and Jewish. This should be the perfect book for me.

But I find myself rolling my eyes at it. I’m falling asleep reading it. I rarely feel like I’m inside it and I feel confused when I feel like I am. In a word, I’m disappointed.

Maybe the heat is getting to me in Brooklyn. Maybe I’m not doing something right. I don’t know. I’m willing to give it the benefit of the doubt. You’ve spoken publicly about these kinds of concerns, and you have interesting things to say. I’m flexible. I’m still willing to read it. I want to want to read it. Is there anything you can suggest? Some encouragement? Some promise or hope? Something?

Sincerely,
David Backer

Benjamin Kunkel, Benedict Anderson, and the Fate of the Novel

The first sections of Imagined Communities by Benedict Anderson read like an unknowing echo to Benjamin Kunkel’s recent piece in n+1 regarding the fate of the novel. In that essay, appearing in a forthcoming collection about the future of books from Soft Skull, Kunkel recounts the publishing industry’s past and juxtaposes it with the digital present. His conclusion is that the novel is on its way out.

While Kunkel uses Regis Debray as his theoretical launchpad, Anderson is a different–but just as helpful–resource.

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Glossing on Fevbre and Martin’s work The Coming of the Book, Anderson points to the emergence of the novel as the emergence of a particular kind of consciousness, one that indicates the birth of an imagination capable of imagining a nation.

The Coming is a history of printing and full-length manuscript publishing. It gives us facts like this: Martin Luther’s theses could be found all over Germany in 15 days because of print-capitalism.

Anderson says the proliferation of the printed word in the form that it proliferated–the novel and the newspaper–show the birth of a “meanwhile” consciousness, one that is aware of multiple story lines occurring in time simultaneously but in different places. He opposes this to a consciousness that sees different events inhabiting the same place at the same time. The distinction comes from Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations. Benjamin calls “meanwhile” time  “homogenous, empty” time and calls the latter “deific.”

Deific time reigned in antiquity. Anderson gives two clear examples of it. (1) A 14th century depiction of the birth of Christ where Mary is dressed like a peasant girl from the 14th century. Here Christ’s birth happens at year 0 but also, it seems, in the 14th century. (2) Christ’s crucifixion and Isaac’s sacrifice, the latter viewed as a prequil to the former. God sees all these events ocurring without timeline, without linear chronology–Abraham and Christ, Mary and 14th century fashion–and so does deific time.

Evidence of homogenous-empty (meanwhile) time is first seen in novels. A character does this and that and, meanwhile, another character does that and this. Then they meet. (It’s also seen in newspapers, where stories are told of events all over the world connected only by the day they occur.)

Anderson argues this kind of storytelling, homogeneous-empty, wasn’t happening in longer literary works before the novel. It was this kind of thinking, among other historical factors, that allowed our species to concieve of ourselves as belonging to a group composed of people we don’t actually know.

A big question mark punctuates the fate of the novel. The economic crisis hit the mammoth, aging publishing industry in ways it’s not recovering from. Technologies are evolving that present words in new ways. Instead of the printed word we have the digitized word. Fiction lives and breathes on the Internet and in e-books and e-readers and iPhones. If Luther were to write his theses now, they would be everywhere in the world in 15 seconds. What does this mean for the novel?

This is where Anderson is helpful. We can use his application of Benjamin’s time distinctions as a lens to look at the novel’s fate.

Our main question might be: Do these technologies constitute another change in our consciousness of time? Do they indicate a third kind of consciousness, different from deific and homogeneous-empty? Or are they just evidence that we’ve carried homogenous-empty time out to its fullest extent?

Lets say “Yes” tentatively. If the emergence of the Internet and related digitizations indicate a new consciousness of time then maybe the novel will become obsolete, just as other cultural artifacts underwent radical changes during the transition from deific time to homogenous-empty time. In this scenario the novel becomes a  stepped-upon rung of the ladder of our evolution, replaced as an art form in the popular mind like the orchestra was replaced by the band and the painted portrait by the photo and theater by film.

But even if we say “No” we get a similar answer. Lets say these technologies don’t indicate a new consciousness but rather they’re just a full flourishing of homogeneous-empty time. In this case the novel still has a predominantly historical role to play. The novel indicated the birth of homogeneous, empty consciousness and now that that consciousness has matured. We may have to build a monument to the novel’s importance, say our goodbyes, and expect a future that excludes it from the main stage though it helped to build the stage itself.

Either way you look at it, applying Anderson’s distinction yields what may be a disturbing concept: It’s neither the publishing industry nor its product but rather us, the human being, that’s changing as our technologies advance. Kunkel quotes Jonathan Franzen to this effect, “Haven’t we all secretly sort of come to an agreement, in the last year or two or three, that novels belonged to the age of newspapers and are going the way of newspapers, only faster?”

Our digitization is evidence  of a change in our consciousness, so it makes sense that the novel and its role in our lives must change with us.