I barely remembered this as part of my DARE training in 4th grade, but now it seems extremely helpful–particularly with insidious ideologies. (Thanks for remembering Erica!)

I barely remembered this as part of my DARE training in 4th grade, but now it seems extremely helpful–particularly with insidious ideologies. (Thanks for remembering Erica!)

During my time as a situated philosopher for Harrison Atelier‘s production Veal, I created this Prezi tracking the philosophical ‘history’ of the human/animal distinction. It’s an unfinished experiment in philosophical form (as opposed to writing philosophy as an essay or book, for example). Click in an out of the circles to view passages of texts throughout four “epochs” of philosophical activity surrounding humans and animals.
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Tagged animal, animal philosophy, Bataille, book, essay, Harrison Atelier, harrison atelier veal, human, philosophy, Prezi, situation, Veal
I served as a “situated philosopher” for this upcoming production at the Invisible Dog. Should be interesting to see.
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Tagged animals, Harrison Atelier, industrial food, Invisible Dog, situated philosophy, Veal
I’ve been playing a slightly reworked version of this unrecorded Woody song for various StrikeDebt events, most recently the People’s Bailout telethon as part of the Rolling Jubilee.
Earlier today I played it to convoke the “Winter Jubilee,” an SD open house event including readings, speeches, magic, and a debtor’s version of Rapunzel.
I’m moderating an online discussion this week at artequalstext.com. Here’s the prompt:
My question for this week’s discussion is about meaning, pictures, and reality. Given Mel Bochner’s explicit interest in Ludwig Wittgenstein–and this exhibit’s general interest in language and art–it could be interesting to (re)visit what Wittgenstein, early in his career, called the “picture theory of meaning.” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes it well. “According to this theory propositions are meaningful insofar as they picture states of affairs or matters of empirical fact.” Wittgenstein writes as much in proposition 4.01 of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
“The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is.”
We picture reality to ourselves–that’s what it means to “make sense” in the picture theory of meaning. One interpretation of this theory, extremely significant for the history of science, is that “[a]nything normative, supernatural or (one might say) metaphysical must, it therefore seems, be nonsense.” (IEP) Since we can’t picture things that are “metaphysical” like God, morals, or existence-as-such (things beyond what we can observe), then it is impossible to make sense when talking about them.
This is generally called “the problem of unobservables,” and was present in the positivist and empiricist traditions both before and after Wittgenstein’s early work. A common response to this problem, and Wittgenstein’s view of it, is that the things we can’t observe–God, morality, even knowledge itself–seem very real to us, perhaps more real than the things we observe!
Here is a fascinating occasion of tension, particularly between art and text. On the one hand, the picture theory of meaning prioritizes images. Without images we can’t understand what we mean when we communicate with one another. On the other hand, this same theory rejects the possibility that we can make sense when communicating about what seems the most real: God, morality, and what it means to exist. My questions, huge as they may be, are: What is reality? Is it what we picture or what we observe? In other words, is it possible to make sense when speaking about things we can’t observe? What role do images play here?